Cosmological argument: Argument
for the existence of God - a divine maker of all there is - based on the
argument that everything must have a cause.
argument is one of the most common arguments for God's existence, but
it is obviously flawed in at least three ways:
1. If everything must have a cause, then so must the supposed First
Cause, that usually is styled 'God' (and normally without further
argument also declared to be benevolent, infinite, all-knowing, and
all-powerful). And if not everything must have a cause, the whole
argument fails to start, and indeed the universe may exist accidentally.
Note what the logical difficulty here is: If everything must have a
cause, it does not follow that there must be a first cause, but
that there cannot be a first cause, for it then too must have a cause.
So it seems more sensible to infer that, first, not
everything must have a cause, and second, while there is excellent
reason to assume there is one natural reality
of which everything that exists is a part,
there is no good reason to assume more than that, such as divinities,
angels, devils etc., for which there is little
evidence that they exist, and much
evidence that at least most of these supposed
entities are merely fantastic, and
based on fear, ignorance or
2. In a somewhat different style, but to similar effect, it is often
argued that everything (made) must have a maker, or designer, or else it
could and would not exist. This assumption has a similar flaw: If
everything must have a maker or designer, the first maker or designer
must also have a maker, and we proceed again to an infinite list of
makers of makers of makers of ... Hence, as with the first argument, it
makes much more sense not to start that infinite regress by assuming
that there must be a maker of what exists. (See:
3. Finally, there are two objections to the move that is often made
to save the introduction of a First Cause of all, namely (a) that there
must be an origin or beginning to a sequence of causes (e.g. for it to
have started or be possible at all) and (b) that the First Cause is so
perfect (or peculiar, or special, or powerful) that it, unlike
everything else it caused, it is not itself in need of any cause.
The answer to (a) is that this merely begs the question, and that
there seems to be no logical objection whatsoever to an infinity of
times in the past or the future in which there always was something,
possibly complicated by chance to make things happen.
The answer to (b) is that again it begs the question and makes an
assumption that contradicts the notion that everything must have a cause
distinct from itself, that is at bottom of the Cosmological argument.
And furthermore, since God's existence is speculative but Nature's
existence is taken for granted, it seems much more simple to assume that
if there is a First Cause that always existed, it is nature rather than
something that made nature - which has the additional logical
shortcoming that it assumes far more than needs to be assumed to start